form a highly interdependent network that must be pro tected against both intrinsic defects and active attacks. This requires local as well as joint situational awareness based on current, accurate, and semantically unambiguous data as well as simulations, particularly of attack scenarios, necessi tating in turn automated information sharing measures that can span transitive dependency networks.
L INTRODUCTION
T HE protection of critical infrastructures such as en ergy, financial services, health care, public services, and transportation [IJI has moved from being primarily driven by safety and engineering concerns to also incor porating elements of security, particularly from external hostile actions, but also including sabotage from within.
Critical infrastructures in most industrialized countries share several characteristics that make their protection, particularly as a cohesive system, difficult.
Foremost among these is that the majority of the in frastructure is owned by commercial or semi-commercial interests (e.g. municipal utilities) that must operate com petitively, with limited capital investment and operational expenses. That, in itself, is already constraining decisions regarding the safety and security of infrastructure elements beyond what is either required by regulatory authority and legal requirements or by providing an immediate competi tive advantage [3] .
From the perspective of the overall or national critical infrastructures, respectively, however, another issue result ing from civilian ownership is that the very information and exchange of information required to maintain either interdependent elements of the infrastructure or the entire S. Wolthusen is with the Security Technology Department, Fhl.Unhofer-IGD, Darmstadt, Germany. E-mail: wolt@igd.fhg.de.
1 While there exists a consensus on the sectors considered to be part of the infrastructures beginning with 11j, the precise elaboration and granularity of sectors differs in the various national approaches 12].
0-7803�8572-1104/$20.00 ©2004 IEEE infrastructure can put the civilian infrastructure owners at a disadvantage. This can e.g. occur when required infor mation sharing in a given sector exposes business intelli gence (e.g. cost structures, capabilities) to competitors in the same or another sector. Another potential impediment to information sharing is particularly prominent in case of natural monopolies (e.g. certain utilities). Here, disclosure of mishaps or even simply potential vulnerabilities can be correlated immediately with its most likely origin, poten tially resulting in decreases in the valuation of the infras tructure owner.
Therefore, while information gathering and sharing are critical elements in both the prevention of harm to criti cal infrastructure and the timely and efficient remediation of any problems that occur within the network of interde pendent infrastructure components, the flow of information itself must be closely monitorable and controllable if infras tructure owners and operators are to engage in it. This is e.g. clearly reflected in the U.S. approach to CIP following the catastrophic terrorist attacks of 2001 [4] , [5J.
Moreover, the information collected and exchanged in the interest of improving the robustness, availability, and overall assurance of infrastructure elements must also be protected against malicious outside interest and influence.
While much of the focus in infrastructure protection (CIF) is traditionally provided by the safety engineering commu nity, the possibility of deliberate attacks introduces a num ber of new failure modes that either have been considered impossible or at the very least highly improbable and have therefore not been given adequate consideration.
This paper therefore outlines a mechanism for modeling infrastructure elements both at the level of data collection and exchange and also for modeling and simulation with particular emphasis on protection for information collection and information sharing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sec tion II identifies key requirements for modeling from both the perspective of overall infrastructure protection and the individual infrastructure component owners and operators.
Subsequently, section III provides a high-level outline of the underlying modeling mechanisms while section IV details the security controls and policies defined over the model. Finally, section V briefly discusses prior and related work.
II. REQUIREMENTS
In addition to individual infrastructure component ro bustness and survivability [6] , [7] , [8] , which is beyond the scope of this paper, CIP rests on understanding and dy namically adapting component configurations in such a way that overall objectives (e.g. power plant output to the elec trical grid) are met.
This description is scale-free in its applicability; how ever, some issues become relevant only if geographical and organizational boundaries are crossed in the process.
At the largest scale (i.e. national and multinational structures), information sharing and analytical capabilities among independent entities must be considered the pri mary feasible mechanism for improving infrastructure reli ability and survivability (see section V); for civilian infras tructure owners and operators to conduct the prerequisite information collection and storage activities , CIP activities should be concomitant with other cost benefits.
Consequently, the acceptability of CIP models may be enhanced significantly if, in addition to its primary objec tives, it also assists in providing information that is in ternally useful to an organization, e.g. in identifying in efficiencies and redundancies beyond what is required for protection purposes.
Infrastructure dependencies are, in all but the most triv ial cases, multilateral relations (among intra-organizational infrastructure elements, infrastructure providers, and with government) .
However, the dependencies themselves are both dynamic (including feedback loops) and insufficiently characterized by a simple relation. The former observation implies that the efficacy of an infrastructure model is significantly in fluenced by its coupling with the underlying system (i.e. it is insufficient to operate on data collected by temporally isolated snapshots), while the latter implies a requirement for detailed annotation of relations.
Since individual infrastructure owners generally already operate information systems containing all or significant portions of the data required for CIP; however, direct har monization among such entities for information sharing and exchange is both impractical given the scope of data con tained in such databases, and infeasible given the cost sen sitivities of infrastructure owners.
As a result, a key requirement for information exchange is the use of an interoperable intermediate format of suffi cient generality to contain not only the data elements but also the underlying ontological structures. The latter re quirement not only results from the need to translate data points and relational tuples, but also from the fact that in fr � tructure elements evolve over long time scales -during whICh the semantics of individual data points and metrics are likely to change.
To retain the ability to perform analyses over such chang ing data points, ontological information mu st be retained Even though the ultimate goal of any integrated CIP model is information sharing, access, including read-only provisions to information must be constrained by the least privilege principle [14] with well-defined information flows based on need-to-know and at the same time full auditabil ity of any transfer. As noted in section I, some of these con straints are direct results from the fiduciary duties of civil ian infrastructure owners and operators to equity holders, protecting information system assets and against competi tive intelligence. Moreover, the information to be protected extends to indirect effects such as public confidence in the infrastructure operator, resulting in a requirement for pro tecting even indirect information flows where sources could easily be inferred (e.g. in case of a local power utility as the indirect causative agent for a failure at a water treatment facility).
At the same time, emergency access requirements must be defined in such a way that the transition from normal operation to emergencies is well defined and can be invoked by all authorized parties to the extent necessary (e.g. for providing electrical power to critical areas such as hospitals and air traffic control facilities).
Moreover, reliability models commonly used generally assume stochastic processes in assessing the likelihood of a malfunction or hazard; such assumptions may no longer be made safely since adversaries (particularly terrorists) may deliberately target interdependent networks, thereby indUCing otherwise highly improbable fault chains. Since resources for protecting infrastructures are necessarily fi nite and the number of such scenarios may be assumed to be transfinite, comprehensive analytical methods are un likely to yield usable results. The ability to perform simu lations and case studies of such attack scenarios is therefore of particular pragmatic interest.
III. MODEL STRUCTURE
The following sections provide a high-level overview of the structures used for representation and reasoning over critical infrastructure data. Section III-A represents the highest abstraction level at which entities and dependen cies are represented in the dependency model; the primary focus of this sub-model is scale invariance and efficient rep resentation for use in computation. Moreover, this model also provides the foundation for the control mechanisms discussed in section IV.
Section III-B provides a sketch for the the intermedi ate ontological model and exchange mechanism data for mat. The primary goals for this model (in addition to a straightforward bijection onto the graph-theoretic depen dency model) were the provision of a relatively simple COID man abstract data format for critical infrastructure data, the ability to perform high-level computations over the rep resented entities as well as the dynamism required for real time analysis.
The final layer within this model, namely the mapping of existing databases, sensor data, and other interfaces onto the ontological model (e.g. for geospatial models and databases, wiring topologies, etc.) is beyond the scope of this paper since such interfaces are necessarily product-and typically implementation-specific since most infrastructure owners and operators rely on considerable internal devel opment to provide adequate cataloging and analytical ca pabilities.
A. Dependency Model
To satisfy the requirements outlined in section II, a de pendency model based on multigraphs provides a powerful and general mechanism with a sound mathematical foun dation.
Definition 1: Infrastructure components are separated into entities E (E = {e" ... , ek}) represented as vertices and dependencies V (V = {d�, ... , d�}) among entities represented as directed edges where the set of edges is partitioned into m dependency types, resulting in a graph 9 = (E, V). 9 may contain parallel edges, but may not contain self-loops.
Edges between two given vertices ea, eb are not uniquely identified by the 2-tuple (ea, eb) as is the case in simple graphs since they may differ in their dependency type:
Definition 2: For two given vertices ea, eb within 9, the set of edges must not contain two edges of the same depen dency type.
The set of all dependencies between given vertices ea, eb is denoted as (ea, eb) and abbreviated (a, b 
A.3 Interpretation
The interpretation of entities of the basic dependency graph corresponds directly to that of entities discussed in section BI-B; in case of aggregate dependency graphs, the partitioning and aggregation must follow the semantics of the underlying model (e.g. coalescing vertices within a log ical grouping or, at a higher level of abstraction, within a single organizational entity).
The interpretation of the dependency types is that of a specific category (e.g. electrical power, voice communi cation link, water supply) with edge coalescion providing aggregate dependencies between entities.
Several graph-theoretic algorithms useful in calculating properties of the dependency graph require a bounded edge valuation; dependency strength is therefore required to be individually bounded and re-normalized in case of edge co a1 escion.
Moreover, to retain the ability to apply certain combi natorial optimization algorithms to the dependency graph, dependency strength must be expressed by values EN.
Such numerical valuations are frequently not possible im mediately; it is therefore frequently necessary to perform a translation from qualitative assessments onto a fixed but arbitrary scale (which must be used consistently through out the dependency graph).
B. Ontological Model
As noted in sections III and II, the ontological model must provide a common abstraction layer for the plenitude of underlying data formats.
Data in this format must have well-defined semantics that can be retained over changes in underlying represen tations and storage and be archivable. This represents a particular challenge since the lifetimes of many infrastruc ture components encompasses a large number of informa tion system generations (e.g. in excess of 100 years in case of some water and sewage conduits).
Moreover, in many cases the full semantics is not fully contained in data repositories but only accessible through interpretative logic layers. Given the cost associated with re-acquiring all data (in addition to direct sensor measure ments) as well as the danger of inconsistencies among such parallel repositories, the use of an interpretative interme- Fig. 1 A basic RDF graph can therefore be considered a super set of the dependency graphs discussed in section III-A; several syntactical features such as RDF containers (bags, sequences) can be normalized and decomposed into regular directed graphs for this purpose.
Within RDF, both entities (vertices) and properties (edges) are represented by Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI); while a basic descriptive format exists, this can be extended arbitrarily using the RDF schema mechanism in cluding RDF reification [28] ; this definition includes a semi rigorous model-theoretic definition of the formal semantics of RDF [29] .
It should be noted that the use of URIs for representing underlying representations provides a natural solution for satisfying the requirement for real-time data access and me diation to existing data repositories; this mechanism also permits natural interaction e.g. with web service-based ar chitectures such as those found in geographical information systems [ 30] , [31] , [32] .
The actual ontological representation [331 can also be accomplished using open standards, in this case using the W3C Web Ontology Language (OWL) [ 34] , [ 35] , [36] , [ 37] , which can be considered a syntactical and semantic exten sion of RDF. These standards define descriptions of classes, properties and their instances and, more importantly, se mantic entailments which can be used for reasoning within the ontological model.
For the purposes of the critical infrastructure model, a sUblanguage of the full OWL language is selected, namely OWL DL; this constrains the expressiveness of the onto logical model to those representable by description logics [38] . However, this rather severe constraint is required to retain computability of entRilments. The actual ontology schema definition is beyond the scope of this paper.
IV. SECURITY CONTROLS
As noted in sections I and II, ensuring precise control on a need-to-know basis specified by infrastructure owners is a critical requirement to ensure information sharing that is not coerced by governmental measures.
Unfortunately, most commonly used access control mech· anisms, particularly including access control lists used e.g. in network security devices and commercial off the shelf (COTS) operating systems, are already sufficiently expres sive to ensure that the leaking of access rights (and hence access to information, potentially violating confidentiality and integrity requirements in particular), Le. the security of a given protection system configuration cannot be proven 0·7803-8572-1/04/$20.00 ©2004 IEEE in the general case [39] , [40] .
However, one of the most salient characteristics of an critical infrastructure modeling, simulation, and retrieval system is that pre·determining the characteristics of enti ties to whom access to resources is granted cannot be ef fectively determined a priori. This is particularly causated by the need to include transitive dependencies and interac tions in a number of computations both at the level of the dependency and the ontological model.
While some models commonly implemented in COTS systems, particularly operating systems used in defense and intelligence applications (e.g. the lattice-based model of Bell and LaPadula [41] , [42] , [40] or role-based access control models [43] , [44] ), can provide controls that prevent leaking of rights, the granularity levels feasible in such mod els require a coarse a priori stratification and, moreover, frequently lead to a "mushroom" configuration in which en tities must be assigned high classification levels to permit access at operationally required levels.
For the purposes of the model discussed here, a model that combines more flexibility for the expression of (access) rights transfers but whose security can still be decided is, however, highly desirable.
One such model is the schematic protection model (SPM) developed by Sandhu based on a capability-oriented protec tion mechanism proposed by Minsky [45J, [46] , [47J.
The basic SPM uses a strong type system [48J, [49] , [501 over entities within the protection system, further subdi vided into type families for subjects and objects, and also distinguishing between rights that alter the protection state (control rights) and those leaving it inva.riant (inert rights) to represent confidentiality model similar in expressiveness to monotonic access matrix models.
The rights associated with an entity (which may ulti· mately be considered a capability list) are referred to as the domain of an entity in the SPM, whereas a single right descriptor is referred to as a ticket E/., . where E denotes the entity to which the right., . is to be applied. The model requires that any transfer of rights between subjects occur only if a predicate over each two fixed but arbitrary subject entities is valid per definition 3.
Such rights can be associated trivially both with the edges of the dependency model from section III·A and the ontological model from section III�B, directly mapping the dependency type in case of the dependency model.
Definition 9: Let X, Y be subjects and dom(X) be the set of rights of X and let r be a control right. A local link predicate linki (X, Y) with formal parameters X, Y is de· fined as a conjunction or disjunction of the following atomic terms: In addition to this predicate, which can be considered the connection relation over a rights transfer graph, the SPM further constrains the copying of rights by way of filter functions for given rights:
Definition 4: Let T be the set of all types, R the set of all rights, Ts the set of types for subjects, and a filter function.li be a function Ii : Ts x Ts -> 2TxR.
For given subjects A, B, X of type a, b and x, respec tively, the right X / r : e can be copied if and only there
exists an i such that X/,e E dom(A), link;CA,B), and x/r: e E J;{a, b).
Given these preliminary definitions, a protection scheme is then given by definition 5:
Definition 5: A protection scheme consists of the follow ing elements: (3)) time in the number of subjects [48] by forming the transitive closure for each right, permitting the determination of a maximum state.
The general safety problem for SPM is also undecidable; however, by further restricting the SPM to acyclic atten uating instances, a decidable subset of instances can be obtained [51] .
To this end, the dependency model itself must be trans formed into an acyclical derivative instance, by removing the inbound edge adjacent to a fixed but arbitrary vertex in a given t-cycle.
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The above description provides the means to verifying that no unintended rights transfers can occur within a given model instance. However, a separate category of rights is also required for emergency access.
Emergency access can occur in several variants; the sim plest case is that of an intra-organizational emergency in which regular processes for rights transfers are revoked.
Such limited access may be modeled by predetermining rights types in the schematic protection model instance and considering these rights in a separate step; a similar case can be modeled for multilateral emergency access situa tions (e.g. based on a predetermined contractual regulation that grants a party formal rights to invoke an emergency situation). Even so, the additional rights granted must be selected judiciously so as not to render the security analysis 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The present paper has presented a brief summary of on going research in modeling and simulation for critical in frastructure protection3. In this modeling approach, the precise specification of information sharing mechanisms re garding integrity and confidentiality was given particular attention with the goal of providing (civilian) infrastructure owners with well-defined controls over the dissemination of potentially sensitive information. The graph-theoretical high level model along with a graph-based interoperable lower level model and informa tion exchange format based on open standards presented provides a foundation particularly for automated analy sis and preprocessing without requiring extensive modifi cations to data repositories and acquisition mechanisms at individual infrastructure components, thereby lowering the cost of adopting the proposed model.
Future work to be performed includes the formulation of a precise ontological model and representation schema for multiple domains and investigations into induding expert knowledge of interactions and operations (e.g. for power grids) into such models.
A particular challenge, particularly for large-scale inte grated models lies in constraining the model in such a way that it is suitably amenable to combinatorial optimization techniques, particularly with large number of simultaneous constraints (e.g. using interior point algorithms [62] , [63] , [64] ).
Moreover, the inclusion of time-variable dependencies provides a particular challenge for both modeling and sim ulation but may not be amenable to exact computational approaches; in this case probabilistic modeling may need to be taken into consideration.
